As a discipline perennially caught in cyclical crises, Comparative Literature's concerns once again inhere in its subfield of "world literature."
and not wholly dependent on the other spheres (Casanova 349) . Mufti disagrees with Casanova, arguing that the unequal process through which nonWestern literatures were granted entry into Casanova's "world literary space" cannot be overlooked. Emphasizing the role of Orientalism in the creation of such a literary space, Mufti concludes that the institution of world literature is complicit in a colonial, Orientalist treatment of non-Western literatures, which must be rectified through "better close reading" and "a radically historical understanding of language and the forms of its institution in literature, culture, and society" (Mufti 493) . Although Mufti does not elaborate specifically on what "better close reading" would entail, he asks more generally for greater historicization in literary studies, which in turn promotes greater attentiveness to historical and material shifts in power dynamics.
A recent conversation between David Damrosch and Gayatri Spivak at the 2011 plenary session of the American Comparative Literature Association similarly expresses world literature's disciplinary preoccupation with historicist methods. While Casanova and Mufti debate the literary text's relationship to the material world, Damrosch and Spivak focus on the material conditions of Comparative Literature itself, those that underlie and facilitate the entrance of texts into the newly expanded discipline. Such material conditions include the "uneven global flow of capitalism," and the "neocolonial" tendency to bring raw materials (texts or students) from the colonies for reprocessing in the metropolitan center and then dispatching them back to the colonies (as anthologies and graduates) (Damrosch and Spivak 460) . As a way to combat these oppressive material conditions, Damrosch proposes greater sensitivity to the history of the discipline and its changing terrain. For example, unlike the older practice of Comparative Literature, American classrooms now include students with proficiency in a wider range of languages, and often with better proficiency in some languages than the professor. Damrosch suggests harnessing the possibilities of such a diverse classroom by implementing "a sliding scale" of linguistic fluency (as opposed to the current "native" or "near-native" requirements), and practicing greater collaboration between scholars, teachers, and students (461). In response, Spivak argues that conceiving of the American classroom and academy as collaborative, diverse, and global in fact obscures how such spaces themselves are complicit in global conflict and "the terrible greed of rampant capitalism" (472). Instead, Spivak suggests supplementing the study of world literature with a new approach to the "same old texts," "by undoing them, taking them away from the universal and [giving] them [a] kind of singularity […] to singularize rather than provincialize the European context of comp lit" (473). Once again, such singularization can only be achieved through greater historicization and contextualization.
The Casanova-Mufti and Damrosch-Spivak exchanges, therefore, suggest that the study of world literature requires an attendant focus on positivistic, historicist academic practices. This tendency to assign historicist literary methods to the study of non-European literatures, however, is neither entirely novel nor without its critics. Already in 1991, Rey Chow had articulated the problem of "literary historical methodology" dominating the study of non-European literatures. Chow argues that the insistence on such methodology in the study of world literature, as opposed to other critical literary theories commonly used to read European literature, poses a "dichotomy between the 'realpolitical' non-West and the 'imaginative' West" (Chow xiii). Consequently, "in an attempt to show 'the way things really are' in the nonWest, our discourses produce a non-West that is deprived of fantasy, desires, and contradictory emotions" (xiii). Spivak's and Mufti's calls for greater historicization, then, could dangerously indicate that "the West owns not only the components but also the codes of fantasy, [and] the non-West is deprived not only of the control of industrial and commercial productions, but of imaginary productions as well," resulting in the promotion of a "hegemonic politics with its presuppositions of what the important messages from the non-West 'really are'" (xiii). While compelling, Chow's injunction to utilize the full breadth of literary theory in the study of world literature remains difficult to execute, raising, instead, a host of concerns about the applicability of "literary theory" to the study of non-European literatures.
Comparatists such as Revathi Krishnaswamy have argued that current literary theoretical methods emerged and developed out of the study of Western literatures in the Euro-American academy, and are therefore incompatible with the study of present-day world literature. In Krishnaswamy's words, "a cursory glance at the contents of any standard anthology of literary theory… quickly reveals that the field of literary theory is a resolutely Eurocentric high ground relatively untouched by the rising tide of globalization" (Krishnaswamy 405) . While the historical breadth of literary theory may be adequately wide, "the cast of characters […] is nevertheless overwhelmingly Western, [and so] literary theory […] [is] the product of cultural or epistemological changes taking place primarily within Europe" (405). As a result, the intellectual tools available to study world literature remain Eurocentric. Extending the current methods of literary theory to world literatures, then, risks perpetuating the very power dynamics that have functioned, until recently, to keep these literatures relegated to the margins of academic study.
Describing the state of the field as "world lit without world crit," Krishnaswamy attempts to rectify what she perceives as an imbalance between Comparative Literature's ever-expanding canon of texts and the availability of appropriate methods with which to study these "newer" texts (402). Krishnaswamy suggests a parallel anthology to the W.W. Norton anthology of world literature, which includes the great works of non-Western litera-tures. Such a companion anthology would include aesthetic and poetic theories from commensurate non-Western literary and philosophic traditions, and in so doing would offer contextually appropriate methods with which to study world literature. Thus, Krishnaswamy proposes a development of "world literary knowledges," which aims to harness the aesthetic traditions, innovations, and knowledges of non-Western literary production, in order to develop "a valuable ethical and epistemological ally of global literary studies" (401).
The aNThologIsT, The expaNsIoNIsT
Although I share Krishnaswamy's concerns with the current disjuncture between a rapidly changing literary canon and the more rooted methodologies and reading practices within the Western academy, I find the solution she proposes highly unsatisfactory. Krishnaswamy's suggestion of "world literary knowledges" entails mining non-Western literary traditions for "indigenous" aesthetic concepts to use in studying texts from the corresponding literary tradition. Echoing precisely the neocolonial, uneven global flow of capitalism that Damrosch and Spivak warned against, such an outlook only reinforces the expansionary tendency of Comparative Literature to "discover" and bring into the Euro-American academy contextually and historically "correct" methodological tools. Such methods would presumably be subsequently assigned to the contextually corresponding non-Western literary tradition; traditional Chinese aesthetics and poetics would offer the most accurate way to study Chinese literature theoretically, for example. Even more problematic is that Krishnaswamy's approach to literary studies hinders comparison, and instead, engenders textual isolation by requiring that each literary tradition be kept in a separate box with its own specific tools of theory.
Such an isolationist approach to the study of world literature is also partly engendered by the genre of the anthology, such as the one Krishnaswamy proposes. Anthologizing world literature is certainly in vogue, as evidenced by several such volumes that have found swift paths to publication over the last few years.
2 Such anthologies promote a widening of scope, aiming to include the greatest number of texts from the greatest number of "overlooked," nationally defined literary spheres. The anthology genre has now crept into literary scholarship on world literature, which often mirrors the anthology, with each chapter of edited volumes on world literature focusing on texts from a discrete literary tradition.
3 Although the anthology genre appears to promote diversity and multitude, the various iterations of this genre in fact betray a singular epistemological approach: world literary scholars dig up and present new literary examples, and these findings are placed side-by-side, as new feathers in the cap of "world literature," neither in conversation with nor of consequence to each other, let alone those texts already in circulation.
Underlying the anthology model of world literature lies the barely-concealed subterranean desire of the Euro-American academy: expansion. Intellectual inquiry in the field of "world literature" has so far been driven by an expansionary impulse, one that locates the object of study as "out there" in the academically undiscovered world. The task of world literature, then, has predominantly involved looking outward towards the (largely non-Western) world, excavating new materials from non-Western literary traditions, and presenting these discoveries to the Euro-American academy. In this way, the field of world literature increasingly functions as a mouthpiece for the EuroAmerican academy's ever-expanding appetite for all things "marginal" and "minor."
A brief look at two seemingly oppositional practices of world literature, through David Damrosch and Emily Apter, reveals the pervasiveness of this outward-oriented expansionary impulse. Damrosch's definition conceives of world literature as those "literary works that circulate beyond their culture of origin…any work that has ever reached beyond its home base" (Damrosch 4) . The practice of world literature, then, involves tracing literary networks, routes of circulation, and historical encounters between a literary work and what Damrosch calls "its newfound foreign friends" (5). Damrosch's project is therefore primary driven by an expansionary thrust, concerned with how texts have travelled out there in the larger world.
Although Apter seems to resist this relentless outward motion, her guiding notion-that of the "untranslatable"-similarly locates the world as "out there." Apter poses the "untranslatable" as a challenge to the uncritical inclusiveness purported by world literature. The "untranslatable" brings to light the failure of literary studies to adequately question the implicit authority scholars bestow upon themselves when assuming that a text is theirs to translate or study. By insisting on a text's right to be "untranslatable," Apter hopes to make comparative literature "geo-politically case-sensitive and sitespecific in ways that avoid reproducing neo-imperialist cartographies" (Apter 42) . While the objects of Damrosch's study lie in a historical and geographic world, the object of Apter's study, the "untranslatable," lies out there in the linguistic world.
The WoRld WIThIN
Under this current expansionary approach, world literature transforms Comparative Literature only on the level of scope -the discipline simply grows larger. As such expansion unfolds, scholars of "non-world literature," who study the largely Western-European texts considered endemic to the disciplinary origins of Comparative Literature, need not engage with this expanding branch of world literature if they so desire. Such a privilege of choice does not extend both ways. Students of world literature continue to undergo rigorous training in the very "Euro-centric" theoretical methodologies they are later deterred from engaging with in their studies of non-Western texts. Instead, they are advised to stick to the sole contextually-compatible method of historicization. I argue that such a power dynamic can only be rectified at the level of method-that "Euro-centric" body of method-by identifying the location of the world as emerging from within the existing body of literary theory.
I suggest that the expansionary impulse in the study of world literature must be at least supplemented, if not temporarily replaced, by an inward gesture. Such a gesture involves locating the world within the current terrain of the Euro-American academy, in order to effect a disciplinary transformation, and eventual displacement of, the "inner core" of Comparative Literature. In order to conceive of the world as always already secreted within our existing theoretical methods, we must reframe our notion of Comparative Literature as always already comprised of the study of world literature, albeit with changing definitions of "world." The current intervention of world literature should occur on the register of positionality, not of content, for an anthology-style expansion can continue to position world literature on the margins if such literature is not deliberately brought into conversation with the field of Comparative Literature as a whole. Positioning the world within literary theory recognizes that it is already woven into our academic fabric and is present in our scholarly methods. The task of world literature, then, is not to look outwards, beyond the current state of the Euro-American academy, but rather, to begin by looking within, and to reveal the presence of the world in our daily academic lives.
Such a conception of the world as within finds precedent in Martin Heidegger's writings. Heidegger famously locates the world not in the exterior or excluded, but rather as "a characteristic of Dasein itself " (Heidegger 92) . 4 The Heideggerian world is not constituted by the sum total of all things ontic or ontological, but rather as a kind of total horizon "'wherein a factical Dasein as such can be said to live" (93). As a place of dwelling, then, world is spatially located "close by," around or surrounding, in a relation of "nearness."
For this reason, Heidegger begins conceiving of the world in Being and Time through a discussion of the umwelt, "the average everydayness," or environment of Dasein (94) . It is in this surrounding environment that Dasein apprehends its being-in-the-world. In its everyday environment, Dasein is in direct, close relation to what Heidegger calls the "ready-to-hand"-things that are of use, equipment. Heidegger cites a hammer as a concrete example of the ready-to-hand, a thing we are likely to encounter in our everyday environments. As a ready-to-hand thing, the hammer evokes an interaction; we pick it up, we handle it, we start to hammer a nail. We pick up the hammer not blindly on a whim, but because we already know (without pausing to think about it) what the purpose of the hammer is. The activity of using the hammer "is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, by which our manipulation is guided" (98). By "guided," Heidegger insists that our interactions with our everyday environment do not occur randomly, we do not roam our everyday as blank slates. What guides Dasein's manipulation of the hammer is everything that has enabled it to already know what the purpose of a hammer is, without having to consciously think about it.
In other words, Dasein exists in a relationship to other entities and beings, and these relationships are formed within a particular horizon of meaning. The craftsman, who may have observed his father handle a hammer during his childhood, does not explicitly evoke memories of his father every time he uses a hammer. Instead, he brings to his encounter with the hammer this past that is particular to him. And so, we dwell in our everyday; we interact with our surroundings, and these interactions are based on our own past experiences, present moods, future decisions, and so on. Heidegger terms such guided manipulation of the ready-to-hand as "reference." References (also translated as "assignments") are formed in our own horizons of meaning, and underlie each of our everyday interactions, even though they are invisible. We are not cognizant of the reference at work.
But then, Heidegger writes, the hammer breaks; the equipment malfunctions. And it is only when the reference "has been disturbed-when something is unusable for some purpose-[that] the [reference] becomes explicit" (105). It is only when the hammer breaks, when it explicitly cannot fulfill its purpose, that its meaning and purpose become visible. Everything we unknowingly experience at the moment when we see the hammer, the entire invisible context surrounding our encounter with the hammer that enables us to automatically pick it up and start hammering, comes into view when confronted with a broken hammer. And at this moment, "the context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality [… ] with this totality […] the world announces itself " (105).
In other words, Dasein apprehends its being-in-the-world at the moment when it catches a glimpse of that which is secreted within, the underlying references that determine Dasein's relationship with its surroundings. Note, here, that what the broken hammer reveals is not some transcendental or universal truth. Rather, it is the coming into view of Dasein's own-most horizon of meaning. "World," thus, can neither be generalized nor detached from Dasein's own particular relation with its everyday environment.
What happens, then, when what comes into view is not the materialization of one's own horizon of meaning, but rather, a horizon of meaning that has been inscribed by a force exterior to the self? What happens when in the moment of malfunction, the self catches a glimpse of the world not as its own, but rather as that in which the self is oppressed. In this case, what announces itself is a colonized world, one in which the colonized self has no own-most horizon of meaning, only that which is always already inscribed by the colonizer.
5
In many ways, Dasein's encounter with the malfunctioning ready-to-hand echoes a central preoccupation of postcolonial theory. Gayatri Spivak's notion of worlding brings to light this perverse Heideggerian world, one that activates not freedom but the crisis of the self who is robbed access to its own horizon of meaning. Spivak conceives of worlding as the process through which the world has come to be inscribed in the Western intellectual tradition. In Spivak's account, the imperialist project treated the third world as "previously uninscribed," and then proceeded to inscribe it in order to make the third-world "into an object to be understood" by the West (Grosz 1). In this way, the Western institution has fostered an entrenched intellectual practice of knowing the third world through oppressive systems of inscription. For Spivak, the production of knowledge of the third world hinges on this ongoing "worlding of the world," in which the third world is constantly erased and inscribed by the sweeping hand of the Western institution.
How can the Heiddegerrian world as Dasein's open and wholesome being in its everyday horizon of meaning, confront Spivak's conception of the world as the process through which the Third World subject is violently rendered absent? In Provincializing Europe, Dipesh Chakrabarty provides a possible reconciliation. Chakrabarty presents two registers of History (with a capital H), what he refers to as History 1 and History 2. History 1 encompasses the register of the total, the universalizing narrative that Spivak conceives of as erasing the presence of the world, and History 2 presents the register of the particular, the life processes, Dasein's own-most horizon of meaning (Chakrabarty 70 ). Chakrabarty conceives of History 1 and History 2 not as opposed to each other, but rather, as fundamentally intertwined. He positions History 2, the everyday particular, as a structural component of History 1, the oppressive universal. History 2, then, functions from within, to constantly puncture and interrupt the "totalizing thrusts" of History 1 (66). Thus, History 1 carries within its own register, the presence of History 2. It is this presence of the particular, or historical difference, that constantly causes the universalizing History 1 to malfunction, to break down. And it is at the moment of breakdown, like with the broken hammer, that historical difference comes into view. This is when the world announces itself.
I weave Heidegger, Spivak, and Chakrabarty together in the following way. For Heidegger, the world announces itself when Dasein's past, present, and future contexts, what constitute its own-most horizon of meaning, comes into view. Spivak poses a challenge to such a conception, arguing that what comes into view does not, in fact, belong to Dasein (in this case, the Third World subject). I read Chakrabarty as suggesting a resolution this problem. Chakrabarty shares Spivak's insistence on historical difference, but contra-Spivak does not conceive of it as forever silenced in the register of totality. Paralleling Dasein's interaction with the ready-to-hand, Chakrabarty argues that the particular, the own-most, is contained within the automaton of the everyday, constantly interrupting its flow and threatening to cause a breakdown. And at the moment when the "sweeping hand" of the Western intellectual enterprise malfunctions, the world comes into view.
Positioning the world within endows the world a specific temporality of presence. I'm thinking here about "the broad present," what Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht introduces as a new notion of time that is distinct from "historical time." Gumbrecht defines "historical time" as that in which "mankind imagines itself on a linear path moving through time," leaving the past behind as it moves forwards toward a future (Gumbrecht xii). The intellectual concept of "historical time" originated in the 1800s, according to Gumbrecht, and has been so influential that this historical worldview continues to be the dominant logic at play, particularly in the Humanistic academy. In contrast, Gumbrecht argues that the historical conception of time is no longer the worldview in which we live our everyday. We now experience everyday as an "ever broadening present of simultaneities" (71). The past is no longer at some distance behind us, and the future is no longer an open horizon of possibilities ahead of us (due to factors like climate change, for example). Instead we live in an ever-expanding present, characterized by immediacy and proximity.
The concept of "world" I posit combines the spatial accessibility of the ready-to-hand with the temporal notion of presence. Through Heidegger, we know that Dasein apprehends its being-in-the-world only in the realm of the everyday, and in interactions with what is close by and accessible. Reading Spivak and Chakrabarty, I have argued that the world is located within the apparatus of the Western intellectual enterprise, not outside of it. Taking seriously Gumbrecht's rupture between our academic practices (which are dominated by historical time) and our everyday experiences in the broad present, it becomes clear that in order to study the world, the presentness of our everyday must enter into our academic practice.
What does all this mean for the study of world literature? I suggest that instead of the expansionary impulse, world literary scholars must begin by lo-cating the world within their own current scholarly spaces, and within daily academic practice. In a practical sense, this means that it is no longer enough to simply present new literary materials as anthologized examples. The historicizing and contextualizing of a text should no longer pass as the exclusive mode of inquiry into world literature. Scholarship on world literary texts should no longer begin and end (as is the case too often) with a biography of the author, a discussion of the historico-political conditions that surround the text, and an attempt to recreate the experience of the text's "original" and "intended" readers. Instead, harnessing the full spectrum of literary theory, we must reveal how the text lies within and constantly disrupts the everyday functioning of our own theoretical apparatus in literary studies. Only in addressing this question, can the text announce itself as a world literary text, regardless of whether it is "non-Western," "marginal," or "minor."
I define "world," therefore, not as a geographical entity, but rather, as an epistemological strategy that trips up the mechanisms and interrupts the constant hum of the Euro-American academy from within. Following Heidegger, the practice of world literature would involve handling what is close by and ready-to-hand, in this case, the lineages of literary or critical theory that comprise theoretical methodologies of Comparative Literature, with an attentiveness to the moments when such theories "malfunction" to reveal a text's own horizon of meaning.
WoRldINg The laNguage of TheoRy-aN example
Methodological transformation, then, must take as its starting point the full spectrum of Comparative Literature's literary methods. Mining non-Western literary traditions for theoretical concepts remains, in my mind, a futile project if the new method uncovered bears no consequence on the existing body of literary theory. A plethora of worldly theoretical concepts existing side-by-side are inconsequential if these theories do not participate centrally in existing theoretical conversations. In order to develop a theory of world literature, we need to fundamentally transform the very language of literary theory in such a way that all subsequent use of the theory is forever marked by the presence of the world within it.
To achieve this, to reveal the inextricable workings of the world within literary theory, we must work from within existing lineages of literary theory itself, transforming the language of theory by inflecting it with the languages of the world. As premised upon multi-lingual academic inquiry, a critical engagement with language is not only central to Comparative Literature but is also a powerful, shared resource for productive interactions with literary theory. Thus, the word "language" in the title of this section refers both to the language of literary theory, the often abstract, obscure, and neologistic Western-European language, and to the languages of the world. The mar-riage of the two, then, comprises what I put forth as "worlding theory."
To present a concrete example of worlding a ready-to-hand literary theory through language, I examine the theoretical possibilities of the English prefixal word "inter," commonly used to mean "among" or "in between." This prefix has experienced rich theoretical lives in postmodern and deconstructionist postcolonial theories. Examining the theoretical harnessing of "inter" and its worldly iterations demonstrates the way in which language can be strategically employed to interrupt the universalizing flows of literary theory.
In The Location of Culture, Homi Bhabha famously theorizes in-betweenness as the state-of-being of the postcolonial subject. Rejecting the view of colonialism as an enclosed, coherent, total, and totalizing operation, Bhabha argues against the view of colonizer and colonized existing in a dialectic structure. Instead, for Bhabha, colonial and non-colonial forms of knowledge exist not as bounded entities but as ambivalent "in-betweens" that simultaneously affirm and undercut each other. The notion of hybridity exemplifies such in-betweenness in its characteristic lack of primordial unity or fixity, constituted, instead, by a liberating language of ambivalence, manifold enunciation and translation, discontinuous temporality and cultural difference. Such productive capacities of hybridity arise in the interstitial "Third Space," "the split-space of enunciation [which] may open the way to conceptualizing an international culture, based on the inscription and articulation of culture's hybridity […] It is [an] 'inter'-the edge of translation and negotiation, the inbetween space" (Bhabha 56) . Central to Bhabha's conception of cultural hybridity and inbetween space, lies the state of mimicry, in which, due in large part to colonial administrative policies, the colonized subject is granted a partial presence in the colony which renders him almost the same as the colonizer but not quite, neither one nor the other (121-31). As a result, the colonized subject, in a state of constant ambivalence, slippage and classificatory confusion, poses a threat to the colonizer's attempts to fix, categorize and rule. In this way, Bhabha renders his "mimic man" powerful in his indeterminacy and his occupation of the in-between space. Bhabha's theory of "inter," thus, opposes fixed binary divisions in true postmodern fashion, and argues instead for the location of culture in "in between," interstitial spaces.
Diverging from Bhabha's conceptualizing, in Spivak's early work, "inter" denotes not a historical position but rather a discursive one. Spivak's theory of "inter" congeals within the figure of the subaltern. In opposition to the positivist and taxonomic way in which members of the Subaltern Studies collective define "subaltern," Spivak initiates a redefinition. She reads the subaltern as that which is "defined as a difference from the elite": the category, at least in its ideal form, no longer corresponds with a specific class or social strata; instead, its "identity is its difference" (Spivak 285; emphasis added) . In a signature Derridian move, Spivak overturns the category of "subaltern" into that which can no longer be conceived of as a concept in itself. Instead it stands in difference from the hegemonic discourse that excludes it, and in doing so, threatens the unity and coherence of the discourse and its logic of exclusion. In other words, the subaltern subject is "irretrievably heterogeneous"-it defies the positivist tendencies of representation while simultaneously threatening the coherence of that which attempts to represent it (284). In this way, while Bhabha's "inter" figure of hybridity exists between the opposing sides of a dialectic structure, challenging the bounded and fixed nature of totalizing discourse, Spivak's "inter" figure of the subaltern is constituted by the intersecting inscriptions of overlapping discourses that falsely claim to represent a subject while instead rendering it silent.
The English prefix "inter" upon which such theories are founded in fact holds within it a forgotten history. Etymologically study reveals that this Latin prefix finds relatives in a host of linguistic lineages, including in Sanskrit, through the word antar. Antar evokes three interrelated concepts that roughly encompass most of its usages. In its colloquial use in Hindi, the noun form of antar connotes two distinct senses. The first conveys meanings of "difference," as in "the difference between A and B" (A aur B mein antar), while the second expresses meanings of interiority, as in the common expression antar kholna meaning to reveal's one's antar, here, vulnerability or inner secret. In addition to "difference" and "interiority," as a prefix, antar also translates the English use of "inter" as indicative of inbetweenness (the Hindi word antarashtriya mirrors "international" both in structure and meaning). These multi-faceted uses of antar are summarized in The Oxford Hindi-English Dictionary as follows:
antar (Sanskrit), male. 1. Interior, middle, midst. 2. Soul, mind, heart. 3. Mystery, secret. 4. Property, peculiarity. 5. Intervening space or time; distance; separation; gap; period; pause, stop. 6. Difference (between); distinction.
antar-(Sanskrit). Prefix. 1. Interior, inner; internal. 2. Intermediate. 3. Within, among; Other compound words include: antargat meaning internal, innermost, hidden, within; antardhān meaning disappearance, concealment, secret; and antaryāmi, the supreme being who resides within (OEHD 6). Every utterance of antar simultaneously expresses a plethora of meaning, moving seamlessly between connotations of difference, internal space, and interstitiality. The capacity of antar to convey, in an instant, such richness of meaning enables this word, I argue, to bear the weight of theory.
In order to enact a worlding of theories of "inter," I read notions of "inter" in Bhabha and Spivak as holding within a flickering image of antar, which in turn causes such theories to stumble over antar's preoccupation with interiority and difference (meanings that fall out the English use of "inter"). In its current theoretical usage, "inter" locates the subject "in between" ("neither nor" in Bhabha's hybridity), casting the boundedness of the self as a myth and relegating interiority to a relational position, only identifiable in comparison to what is around it. Twinning "inter" with antar brings back into the forefront the prospect of an autonomous, bounded, and interior self, a possibility that ceases to exist in Bhabha and Spivak. In this way, the etymological connection between "inter" and antar allows every evocation of "inter" to carry within it the forgotten trace or repressed memory of antar.
Further strengthening the potential of antar as a rich theoretical concept is its ability to address the concerns of Bhabha's critics, among whom Benita Parry has proven most outspoken. In "Signs of the Times," Parry's critical essay on The Location of Culture, she argues that Bhabha's analysis of colonialism is agonistic instead of antagonistic. She asks incredulously, "In rejecting 'antagonistic' in favor of 'agonistic,' is [Bhabha] then positing colonialism as a competition of peers rather than a hostile struggle between the subjugated and the oppressor?" (Parry 63 ). Proceeding to reveal Bhabha's tendency to "erase inscriptions of inequality and conflict in the material colonial world," she demonstrates that in Bhabha's project, '"difference' has been diverted by a postmodernist criticism as a theoretical ruse to establish a neutral, ideologyfree zone from which the social dissension and political contest inscribed in the antagonist pairing of colonizer/colonized have been expelled" (63, 65). In proposing a transformed reading of inbetweeness, antar survives Parry's criticisms, for every evocation of antar carries with it the assertion of difference, the "antagonist pairing," which rejects the neutrality of an "ideology-free zone," and instead, without making emancipatory claims of liberation, allows the subject to wholly inhabit the dissension and contest of its existence.
Antar shares with Spivak's reconceptualization of the subaltern a focus on such difference, creating a particularly fruitful conjunction between "inter" and antar in Spivak's thought. When revealed as a so-far concealed yet present aspect of the subaltern, antar's emphasis on the interior disrupts Spivak's insistence on silence as a marker of epistemic violence. For Spivak, any attempt by intellectuals to retrieve the subaltern from the silences of "imperialist epistemic, social, and disciplinary inscription" results in the intellectual's representation of the subaltern; the subaltern remains silenced by the intellectual's presumed knowledge of subaltern consciousness (itself inseparable from the intellectual's own consciousness) (Spivak 285) . How can "the people or subaltern-which is itself defined as a difference from the elite" be represented or known by the very classes from whom they are defined against, and at the same time retain their fundamental difference? Much as the sati widow, who becomes silent and therefore subaltern at the moment of her death, Spivak's subaltern subject exists in the oppression of its silent unknowability.
Antar allows for the possibility of reading silence not only as the marker of representational violence, but also as an indicator of the interior self 's continuing presence, even in the face of such violence. Silence no longer functions as the exclusive marker of oppression, but can now also indicate the preservation of self under such conditions of oppression, the role of literary critics emerges as transformed. Critics need no longer rush to speak the silence of the subaltern. 6 Now, by reading antar as inextricably intertwined with "inter," the subversion latent in every instance of silence comes into view.
Inscribing the story of antar into theories of "inter," thus, opens up the theoretical possibility for a figure that, contra Bhabha and Spivak, is no longer constituted solely by the discourses of its oppression. The lurking presence of antar affords such figures a bounded interiority that the discourses of "inter" cannot account for. At the same time, conceiving of antar as a psychoanalytic repressed memory, or more hopeful version of the Derridean trace, ensures that this worlding of theory is taking place not outside of ongoing conversations on postmodern and postcolonial theories, but as a disrupting presence within them.
***
Worlding theory, as I suggest through the example of antar, would allow comparatists to position the search for appropriate world literature methodology within Comparative Literature's body of theoretical texts. In order to world theory, I argue that comparatists should approach the current terrain of literary theory from within, rather than from without, with the express goal of transformation rather than expansion. Scholarly engagements with world literature have largely tended to abstain from literary theory, often with the detrimental effect of stripping such literary texts of an imaginative apparatus, and of abstract and theoretical energies. By locating my intervention within the language of current critical theory, I aim to simultaneously harness the resources of Western theories and break free from the exclusiveness purported by those who deem such theories to be "Eurocentric" or contextually-bound. Scholars of Comparative Literature are best equipped to undertake such a task of worlding theory. Close reading the language of theory requires both linguistic skills as well as the ability to handle texts-capabilities that comprise the basic tenets of Comparative Literature. In this way, worldly concepts that have been excluded from literary theory need not exist as separate from ongoing theoretical conversations, but rather can participate within
